Last month, election officials and poll workers from communities across the United States came together to facilitate the 2024 election. Despite a series of hoax bomb scares and isolated disruptions at polling locations, years of preparation to ensure a safe and secure vote paid off. At the same time, analysis of new BDI data for November shows that election officials and poll workers were forced to carry out their duties in the face of a wave of targeted threats and harassment. This spike in election-related targeting comes amid a broader climate of hostility towards local public officials that is poised to continue beyond the post-election period, posing a persistent danger to democracy and civic space in 2025.

To measure the frequency and spread of threats and harassment against local officials in America, BDI maintains the Threats and Harassment Dataset (THD), an event-level dataset that is part of our mixed-methods Understanding Threats and Harassment Against Local Officials (UTH) research project. Updated monthly, the THD tracks incidents of hostility against a wide range of local officials, including election officials as well as elected leaders like mayors, judicial officials like county prosecutors, school officials like district superintendents, and more. From the start of data collection in January 2022 through November 2024, the THD has captured more than 1,400 unique events across nearly every state in the country.¹

Using new data covering the full election period, this analysis maps key trends in election-related threats and harassment through the run-up to the vote and its immediate aftermath. It focuses on hostile activity targeting election officials, poll workers, election judges, and volunteers working in an official capacity to support the voting process.² The findings provide a deeper understanding of the threat environment in which these civil servants carried out the 2024 election, and offer lessons for future election protection efforts going forward.

Overview: Election-Related Threat and Harassment Trends for 2022-2024

Between January 2022 and November 2024, BDI recorded approximately 170 election-related incidents of threats and/or harassment targeting local officials around the country. Election officials and poll workers, specifically, were targeted in most of these events — approximately 140 — with over 35 additional events targeting other local officials like judges due to election-related issues. These totals reflect reported events that meet the THD’s specific inclusion criteria and methodology³ and should be understood as conservative estimates of all threat and harassment activity targeting local officials. 

Incidents targeting election officials and poll workers were reported in just under half of all states during this period. Some of the most common types of hostile incidents were social media death threats and threats of physical violence over fraud claims; intimidation aimed at convincing officials to follow or ignore election law; text messages threatening arrest if past election results were not overturned; and the doxing, stalking, or following of officials. 

Sixteen threat and/or harassment incidents targeting election officials and poll workers were reported during the week of the election, as well as another two events targeting other types of officials over election-related topics. This marks a spike in targeting for these officials during the week of the election following a steady rise during the course of October, and an increase compared to the previous election cycle during the 2022 midterms (see graph below). Data for the remainder of November shows sustained election-related targeting through mid-month as outstanding races were called. 

This surge in events is concentrated around the immediate election period, with election-related incidents returning to average levels in the post-election period during the second half of the month. By the end of November, trends shifted towards hostility motivated by both national and local issues related to the outcome of the election, rather than the election process itself. These incidents included targeting connected to the proposed immigration policies of the incoming administration, for example: at least three local elected officials faced hostility in late November over their opposition to deportation plans, with one official targeted after announcing they would use local funds to fight deporations in their jurisdiction. 

Although election workers were able to ensure that the election remained safe and secure for voters, the data shows that they did so under intense pressure. These findings confirm that while the election was carried out peacefully overall, the work was conducted in an environment of significant hostility for election workers themselves. 

This environment has created significant challenges for election worker retention. A 2024 report from the Bipartisan Policy Center found that election official turnover “has been increasing steadily for two decades.” Their research demonstrates that “the elections workforce is resilient, even in the face of mounting responsibilities, increased threats, and heightened public scrutiny,” but also underscores that more support is necessary over the long term, outlining a series of recommendations for policymakers that includes efforts to “increase funding for election administration, foster professionalization, and protect the safety of these critical officials.”

Hostility Surged Going Into Election Week

Threat and harassment incidents targeting election officials first began to increase in mid-October, with over 20 events recorded between October 15 and November 4 in the lead-up to Election Day (see graph below). Ten additional events targeting election workers were recorded on Election Day itself, ranging from online death threats to in-person intimidation at polling locations.⁴ 

Trends in threats and harassment targeting election officials have varied by location. The data shows that counties at the center of disinformation campaigns led by election denial groups saw particularly high levels of threats and harassment. Many of the unfounded allegations of widespread voter fraud that generated hostility in the aftermath of the 2020 election also fueled targeting in 2024, with some of the same officials facing renewed threats. For example, 12 incidents were reported in October and November in Arizona’s Maricopa County, which has been a major focus of false fraud claims since 2020.

Other fraud allegations or claims of partisan tampering drove hostility during the week of the election, as some voters took to the internet to post threats related to early poll closures, malfunctioning voting machines, or perceived unfairness of election staff. For example, a Harris County, Texas election official was targeted after they reported, and later corrected, an error in early voting numbers. Officials in Bucks County, Pennsylvania faced national attention and hostility through November over comments regarding balloting processing rulings from the state’s high court, and false claims they engaged in partisan tampering for national and state candidates.

Election officials typically face higher rates of in-person hostility than other types of local officials, in large part due to the frequency of encounters at in-person election activities like early voting or ballot processing at election offices. In-person incidents, where threats and/or harassment were carried out by perpetrators in direct physical proximity to their targets, increase for election officials during election periods when these activities occur. This year, election officials experienced at least 16 in-person incidents in October and November, compared to just three for the rest of 2024. Approximately 30% of all events targeting election officials involved a physically present perpetrator, compared to approximately 13% for judicial officials and approximately  17% for school officials. However, as noted earlier, election officials experience this targeting in more concentrated periods compared to their counterparts because of the election calendar. For example, on November 5, an individual reportedly harassed election staff in New London County, Connecticut, and attempted to intimidate an official by hovering over them. In Summit County, Ohio, a candidate was reported to have harassed election staff over voter rolls, prompting law enforcement to be called in to de-escalate the situation.

Other Types of Local Officials Also Face Increased Risk During Election Periods

Spikes in incidents targeting election officials often correspond to the election calendar, with increases recorded in October and November, when elections are typically held. Other types of local officials tend to experience hostile incidents in less concentrated periods across months, with events linked to a wide range of topics including hyperlocal issues separate from national politics and election-related developments.

Still, while election officials are targeted in the majority of election-related incidents, election-related hostility targeting other types of officials can also increase during election periods. In October 2024, judicial officials in Fulton County, Georgia, for example, were targeted after judges ruled on two cases impacting ballot processing for the election. On Election Day, a local elected official in Pennsylvania was subjected to death threats online over allegations that the official was illegally campaigning at polling sites. 

This broader pattern of hostility targeting local officials even adjacent to the voting process underscores the heightened risk environment during election periods in a landscape where disinformation around voting security and election tampering is increasingly widespread.

Looking Forward: Threat and Harassment Activity in the Post-Election Period

Threat and harassment incidents targeting election officials are likely to return to average monthly levels in the post-election period. But analysis of BDI data indicates that the broader climate of hostility is unlikely to dissipate after the last vote is counted and the president-elect is sworn in. Threat and harassment activity is not limited to national issues and election periods, and is instead becoming increasingly entrenched at the local level, in the day-to-day functions of government. More must be done to track and push back on abuse targeting local officials not just to prepare for future election periods, but to protect civic space all year round.

Similarly, despite widespread acceptance of the election results, reports suggest that the election denial movement is not “going away — and appears to be strengthening in some areas of the country.” The prevalence of election-related conspiracy theories in 2024 election targeting, and the connection to previous disinformation campaigns that began in 2020, demonstrates that sustained efforts to counter mis- and disinformation will be a necessary component of any effective strategy to reduce the risk of election-related threats and harassment going forward.

It is also clear that hostility is not limited to election officials alone. Complementary survey research by BDI and our partners at CivicPulse find that local elected officials and school board members have experienced consistently high levels of hostility over the past year, and remain worried about future threats to themselves and their families. These concerns are having significant impacts on their willingness to participate in political processes like seeking re-election or attending public events, as well as posting to social media or going out in public when not working. As the incoming administration signals plans to enact major changes to public education policy, for example, school board officials could be among the groups at heightened risk of targeted hostility in the new year.

Ultimately, BDI analysis confirms that threats and harassment spiked around the 2024 election. Election officials and poll workers bore the brunt of the rise in hostility, but officials of all types experienced election-related targeting. Data for the remainder of the month points to a shift away from election-related targeting in the post-election period, but also signals emerging threat patterns related to the outcome – including hostility targeting local officials opposed to the incoming administration’s policy proposals – that could carry through December and into the new year. Tools to counter the normalization of threats, harassment, and violent rhetoric are critical for initiatives to support a healthy democracy over the long term, and continued monitoring of the trajectory of hostility targeting local officials will better equip decision-makers, community leaders, and the broader public with the resources they need to respond effectively in 2025 and beyond.

The THD is publicly available and updated monthly. Please register to access the dataset.