With renewed threats of drop box monitoring from election denial groups like True the Vote, as well as legal decisions that reduce restrictions on vigilante monitoring activity in high-risk states like Arizona and Wisconsin, concerns over voter intimidation are on the rise ahead of the 2024 election. 

While it's critical that officials and communities prepare for the risk of election interference, research shows that drop boxes remain a safe and secure means of voting. Despite widespread reports of potential drop box monitoring during the last cycle in 2022, data collected by BDI indicates that actual physical mobilization was low. Of the 13,000 drop box locations active nationwide that year, monitoring incidents were recorded at just 0.1%.

As the election protection ecosystem comes together to track and push back on these threats, it is equally important that we work to prevent the amplification of rumors and false claims aimed at suppressing voter turnout in targeted communities, which can inadvertently boost the real-world impact of threatened acts of intimidation that have frequently failed to materialize. 

Background

• Drop boxes are a secure and accessible alternative to voting in person or by mail.
• However, since 2020, contention over drop boxes has risen due to a combination of factors, including increased use, false fraud narratives, and varied jurisdictional frameworks.
• Concerns are spiking again in 2024 amid renewed monitoring threats from election denial groups, as well as legal decisions that reduce restrictions on monitoring activity in swing states.

Research

• BDI’s research project was designed to answer two questions: Have online monitoring threats translated into offline, physical activity in the past? And, if so, how prevalent was this activity? 
• While there was evidence of an increase in online threats around drop box monitoring during the last cycle in 2022, there was a gap in data on actual incidents of on-the-ground monitoring activity.
• To fill this gap, BDI systematically tracked incidents of offline activity related to drop boxes across the country in 2022 to create the Drop Box Monitoring Dataset. The dataset reflects the most comprehensive attempt to capture drop box monitoring incidents during the midterm cycle.

Findings

• Despite widespread reporting on potential activity, available data indicates that minimal offline monitoring actually took place in 2022. 
• BDI recorded 44 physical monitoring incidents nationwide that year. The majority occurred in Arizona (25), followed by Pennsylvania (6), Washington (6), and Michigan (5).
• In total, BDI identified monitoring activity at fewer than 20 drop box locations around the country. Of the estimated 13,000 sites active nationwide in 2022, monitoring incidents were reported at 0.1%.
• The vast majority of incidents did not involve open carry of firearms or violence: one case involving firearms was confirmed as well as one case of physical fighting, both in Arizona.

Recommendations

Based on analysis of the data, BDI offers four preliminary recommendations to help prepare for the upcoming 2024 election.

1. National and local stakeholders should build on positive interventions and de-escalation approaches that helped contribute to low levels of physical drop box monitoring and related violence risks in 2022 and 2023, including legal challenges and effective community organizing against election interference. 
2. The wide range of research and election protection groups tracking intimidation and monitoring incidents at voting sites should increase collaboration to ensure timely and clear identification of potential threats at drop box locations to support response.
3. These groups should work to enhance strategic communication coordination to disseminate consistent and accurate information on the drop box voting process and any emerging risks, with a view toward correcting misperceptions of the threat environment and debunking mis/disinformation that could fuel monitoring activity. 
4. And they should prioritize outreach to local communities and trusted information sources like local media to open up space for constructive dialogue and preparatory action around election security issues.

These steps can improve the U.S. political violence early warning infrastructure and help prevent the amplification of rumors, false claims, and unfounded threat messaging aimed at suppressing voter turnout in targeted communities, which can inadvertently increase the real-world impact of threatened acts of intimidation, even when they are not actualized.

Read the full Issue Brief for more, and contact us to request access to the dataset.